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PROVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH OF SAN FRANCISCO
(a Nonprofit Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent.
[1] Religious Societies- Remedies- Prohibition.- Where the
superior court had jurisdiction to determine whether a church
had followed the procedure established by its usage, custom,
rules and regulations in respect to its pastor's position, it had
jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly what those usages
and regulations were and the judicial process should not be
halted by prohibition.
[2] Appeal-Judgments Appealable.-No appeal lies from an interlocutory judgment.
[3] Reference-Appeal.-No appeal lies from an order appointing
a receiver.
[4] Prohibition-Effect of Other Remedies.-Prohibition will not
issue when there is another adequate remedy.
[5] !d.-Acts Prohibitable-Complet.ed Proceedings.-A writ of
prohibition ordinarily issues only to prevent the commission
of a future act and not to undo an act already performed.
[6] !d.-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal Inadequate.
-A remedy by appeal from the judgment at the end of a trial
is not adequate so as to preclude issuance of a writ of prohibition, when the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the
action and no appeal is available before final judgment.
[7] !d.-Adequacy of Other Remedies-When Appeal Inadequate.
-Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only on
appeal from a subsequent judgment, various factors, such as
expense of proceeding with a trial and prejudice resulting
from delay, may operate to make that remedy inadequate and
prohibition a proper remedy.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Reference, § 18.
[5] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition, § 3; Am.Jur., Prohibition, § 47.
McK. Dig, References: [1] Religious Societies, § 14; [2] Appeal
and Error,§ 26; [3] Reference, § 24(2); [4] Prohibition, § 11; [5]
Prohibition, § 6; [6, 7] Prohibition, § 14(2); [8, 9, 13-16] Religious
Societies, § 11; [10] Religious Societies, § 3; [11] Religious
Societies, § 13(1); [12] Religious Societies, § 1.

56

PROVIDENCE BAPTIST CHURCH

v. SuPERIOR CT.

[40

C.2d

[8] Religious Societies-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.
-~-A~ long· as rh·il or property rights are involved, the eomts
will enterbin jurisdiction of rontrover·sies in religious bodiPR
11lthongb some eeelesiasti<'al matters an> ineidf'ntally invoh•f'rl.
[9] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Civil and property rights are involvPd so as to afford a basis for judicial
interference in a church controversy where the real property
of the church and funds collected are involved, and where a
determination of who shall be pastor necessarily presents the
question of who shall receive the emoluments of the office.
[10] Id.-Incorporation.-A nonprofit corporation may be formed
for religious purposes. (Corp. Code, § 9200.)
[11] !d.-Property and Funds.-Insofar as church property and
funds are concerned, a nonprofit church corporation may,
through its directors, require an accounting to be made by
the pastor.
[12] !d.-Congregational Type.-A congregational type of church
exists where each local group is in charge of all its affairs
through majority vote of its members and there is no control
from above.
[13] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Where a religious society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court
may determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was
removed was properly conducted according to the usage, contracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent principles of law if civil and property rights, such as emoluments
of the position, are involved, and in so doing the court is not
interfering with any ecclesiastical function.
[14] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-Generally a
court will decide whether a meeting of a church body or its
officers was properly called or conducted when civil or property rights are involved.
[15] !d.-Internal Affairs-Jurisdiction of Courts.-The superior
court has jurisdiction to conduct a church election, through a
referee appointed by such court, where a fair and proper election cannot be conducted by the church and the election previously held was irregular and of no effect.
[16] Id.- Internal Affairs- Jurisdiction of Courts.-Where the
question presented is whether the property and funds of a
church are being handled in accordance with the by-laws and
[8] Determination by civil courts of property rights between
contending factions of an independent church, notes, 8 A.L.R. 105;
70 A.L.R. 75. See, also, Cal.Jur., Religious and Charitable Societies, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious Societies, § 41.
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rules of the church corporation or such by-laws and rules arc
being properly obsened by the governing body of the chmeli,
those aggrieved may seek redress through court action.

PHOCEEDIJ\'G i11 prohibition to rm;train thr, Supr-rior
Court of thr Cit;' and Count? of Ran F'raneiseo from pro<:ee<ling further in an aetion. ·writ denied.

}<;dwanl D. Mabson for

l'rtitiom~rs.

,Joseph B. fsaa<·.s, Alan H. Criteher, Delany, I<'ishg-old &
Minndri and .Joseph A. Murray for ReRpondent.
CA H'I'EH, ;f.--Prohibition is sought to restrain further
p1·oeeeding·s by respondent court in an action pending therein
in which Proviclem~e Baptist Church of San Francisco, a
nonprofit eorporatiou, and the trustees of the corporation arc
plaintiffs and 1<'. B. Banks, the pastor of the church, is clefrndant.
'l'he action is one for declaratory relief in which it was
asserted by plaintiffs that defendant had been regularly and
properly discharged as pastor of the church but refused to
vanate the poRition and surrender documents and fnnds of
t lw dmreb. 1ssue wa~-; joined by defendant asserting that
he . is the pa~-;tor of the church and rightfully holding his
position.
'l'he action was tried for 10 days before the court without
a jury. Findings were made in which it was stated that the
plaintiff church is a nonprofit corporation duly organized
a1Hl the trustee:;; named were in 1950 the duly elected trustees
of the corporation ; that prior to October 1, 1950, defendant
was thr. pastor mrd spiritual leader of the church but that a
resolution removing him, to become effective on October J,
1!1:)0, hafl been adopted by the trustees on September J 5.
1050, a]J(l, at a meeting of the members of the congregation
alHl corporation on September 16, 1950, a resolution had
been adopted purporting to remove defendant as pastor as of
October l, 1950; that in spite of the resolutions defendant refused to nt<:atr' the position; that defendant and the secretary
of the r.orporation bavP in their· possession funds of the dmrch
a1Hl defPndant has made no report thereof except on AeptPJnlwr G. l!HiO, and two years prior· thereto; that defendant
has in his possession reeords of the corporation showing its
af\sets but refm;es to deliver them to the trustees; that certain
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described real property is owned by the corporation; that
defendant claims but has no interest therein; that defendant
organized the church on June 6, 1943, and it was incorporated
on .Tuly 26, 1945, and defendant was pastor from the beginning; that a "full, free and fair" election cannot be conducted by defendant or the officers of the church and it is to
its members' best i11terest that an election be held under the
supervision of a court appointed referee to determine whether
defendant shall be removed as pastor; that the articles of
the corporation do not specify the number of trustees, but
that there were three originally; that the only election of
directors ever held was on August 21, 1950, when plaintiffs
trustees (three of them) were elected and on September 9,
1950, when two more were elected; that no by-laws have been
adopted; that the commencement of the action was authorized
by the trustees but the "church" employed no counsel to
defend the action; that defendant is the pastor and spiritual
leader of the church; and :finally, that a controversy exists
and the court has jurisdiction.
In its interlocutory judgment the court declared the matters so found and further declared : That the resolutions purporting to remove defendant as pastor did not do so; that the
trustees are entitled to the funds and records of the corporation; that a named referee is appointed to hold an election
among all the members after due notice to determine whether
defendant should be removed as pastor and a named referee
is appointed to take an account to ascertain what defendant
owes the corporation; and reserving jurisdiction to make such
further orders as might be necessary when the referee's reports were in.
Defendant's counsel :filed notice of appeal from the interlocutory judgment on behalf of defendant and purportedly
on behalf of the corporation, although as seen from the :findings the corporation was a plaintiff in the action and represented by other counsel and the action was duly instituteil
by the duly elected trustees of the corporation. That appeal
was dismissed by the District Court of Appeal, First District,
Division One, on October 22, 1951, on the grounds that the
judgment was interlocutory and hence not appealable. (See
Erickson v. Boothe, 35 Cal.2d 108 [216 P.2d 454] ; Lacey v.
Bertone, 33 Cal.2d 649 f203 P.2d 755] ; Lyon v. Goss, 19 Cal.
2d 659 [123 P.2d 11]; Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. etc.
Co., 77 Cal.App.2d 217 [175 P.2d 56].)
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'Tho petition for prohibition names the corporation and
defendant as petitioners and is verified by defendant and
Irene Parker who asserts that she is the secretary of the corporation. Counsel represents himself as attorney for defendant and the corporation. Inasmuch as he was not counsel
for the corporation in the main action (because the corporation was one of the plaintiffs in that action and he represented
the defendant, and no substitution of attorneys appears) we
will treat the petitioner here as being defendant in the action.
In his petition, petitioner alleges the procedural events that
have transpired and then proceeds with many factual allegations such as: The existence of the corporation; that the church
is a local independent entity owing no allegiance to any higher
authority; that there are three directors of the corporation,
of which petitioner is one and Irene Parker and Robert Fite
are the others; that the form of the church is not congregational in that members have no voice in its government, since
deacons are appointed by the pastor and they in turn choose
and remove the pastor. The return to the petition asserts that
the church has a congregational government. All of those
things were presumably determined at the trial of the action
and we do not have a transcript of the proceedings. Implicit
in the findings and interlocutory judgment is the conclusion
that the church is congregational in form and the members
select the officers including the pastor. (1] Under such circumstances if it is decided, as it is later herein, that the court
had jurisdiction to determine whether the church had followed
the procedure established by its usage, custom, rules and regu1at ions in respect to the pastor's position, then the court had
jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly what those usages
and regulations were and the judicial process should not be
halted by prohibition. We take, therefore, the facts as appearing in the interlocutory judgment and findings.
Preliminarily we have the question of whether a writ of
prohibition is the appropriate remedy. [2, 3] Assuming
that a jurisdictional question is presented (whether a court
may adjudicate the issues presented which arise out of a
church controversy), there is no appeal from the judgment
entered because it is interlocutory and no appeal lies from
the order appointing a referee (see Fallon v. Brittan, 84 Cal.
511 [24 P. 381]; Gates v. Walker, 35 Cal. 289; 22 Cal.Jur.
701), there still remains the question of whether an appeal
from the final judgment after the reference is adequate, for
of course an appeal lies from it. [4] Prohibition will not
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when there is anoth<w adequate remedy. (C1:ty of San
lhruo \'.Superior Conrf, ~~6 Ca1.2d 48:3 [224 P.2d 685].) There
is still to lw had the refenn<~e h~· the nefer·ee to take an aecount

and eonduet an eleetion, his rrport to the eourt, and its
adjudication thereon. Petitioner claims as reasons why he
will be injured by having those things done and an appeal
thereafter taken, that he might lose the election and be removed from his position. There is a serious obstacle to a reYiew of the interlocutory judgment by the writ whieh petitioner requests beeause there is nothing there to prohibit.
The interlocutory judgment has been rendered and the referee
appointed. [5] In general, a writ of prohibition issues only
to prevent the commission of a future act and not to undo an
act already performed. (Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Ca1.2d
563 [96 P.2d 107]; 21 Cal.Jur. 581-583.) However, here
things remain to be done, that is, the carrying out of the
rderenees and the adjudication thereon. If there is no jurisdiction to conduct the eleetion there was none to make the
interlocutory judgment. Hence the basic objections are to
that judgment. While we do not have a transeript of the
trial proeeedings leading to judgment yet we do have the
findings and judgment.
[6] It is the general rule "that the remedy in the ordinary
eourse of law by an appeal from the judgment at the end
of the trial is not aflequate when the court has no jurisdiction
to proceed with the action and no appeal is available before
final judgment. (Tomales Bay etc. Corp. v. Superior Court,
:35 Cal.2d 389, 392 [217 P.2d 968].)" (City of San Diego v.
Supen·or Court, s·upra, 36 Cal.2d 483, 485.) While here a
partial trial has been had, there remain things to be done
which would be injurious to petitioner. [7] "\¥here an
order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal
from a subsequent judgment, various factors, such as expense
of proeeecling· with a trial and prejudice resulting from delay, may operate to make that remedy inadequate." (Phelan
v. Snperior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [217 P.2d 951].)
\Ve hold therefore that petitioner's remedy by appeal
from the final judgment is not adequate. Hence prohibition is
the proper remedy.
vV e come, therefore, to the merits of the jurisdictional
question. [8] As long as civil or property rights are involved, the courts will entertain jurisdietion of controversies
in religious bodies although some ecclesiastieal matters are
im~iclentally involved. (Rosicnwian Fellowship v. Rosicrudan
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Fellowship N on-Sectat·ian Church, 39 Cal.2d 121 [245 P.2d
481] .) [9] That there are civil and property rights present
is apparent from the findings and judg-ment. The real property of the organization and funds collected are involved.
Necessarily involved in the determination of who shall be
pm;tor is the question of vvho shall receive the emoluments of
the offiee, whieh presents a problem involving civil and propt'l'ty rights.
[10] Here we have a religious group incorporated under
the nonprofit corporation law. Such a corporation may
be formed for religious purposes. (Corp. Code, § 9200.) \V e
may assume that the members of the corporation are members
of the church, as such corporations contemplate membership
(see Corp. Code, § § 9301, 9600-9611) and that its powers are
exercised by a board of directors (see Corp. Code, § 9500).
[11] Insofar as the church property and funds are concerned, we can see no reason why the corporation, through
its directors, cannot require an accounting to be made by
the pastor. (See Bouldin v. Ale.rander, 103 U.S. 330 [26
L.Ed. 308] .)
\Vith respect to the pastor's compensation and, necessarily
incidental thereto, who shall receive it and who shall hold
the position, a somewhat different question is presented. The
t•(mrt found that both the directors and members had passed
n•Rolutions removing defendant; that these resolutions were
not effective; and that a fair election among the members
could not be held under the auspices of either the directors
or defendant. These findings indicate that the members
may exercise the po·wer of removal. So far as appears from
the findings and judgment, there are no church tribunals
whieh determine these questions. [12] Apparently the
churrh iR the congregational type in which its affairs arc
t·ontrol!f~d by the members.
That type exists "where each
local group is in eharge of <ill its affairR through majorit.''
\'of(~ of it,; members and there i.s no control from above."
( Rosicr11cian P'ellowship v. Rosicrncian Pellowship Non-Ser?tarian ChuJ"ch, supra, 39 Cal.2d J 21, 133.) [13] Although
there are cases seeming-l,v to the contrary (see 76 C.J.S., Religious Soeieties, § 89), it has been held that where a religious
society has no tribunal but the congregation, a court may
determine whether the meeting at which a pastor was removed was properly conducted according to the ·usage, contracts and rules of the society, or according to pertinent
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principles of law where civil and property rights, such as
the emoluments of the position, are involved, and that in
so doing the court is not interfering with any ecclesiastical
function. (See Dyer v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.App. 260
[271 P. 113]; Longmeyer v. Payne, (Mo.App.) 205 S.W.2d
263; Jennings v. Scarborough, 56 N.J.L. 401 [28 A. 559];
Evangelical Lutheran St. Paul's Congregation v. Hass, 177
Wis. 23 [187 N.W. 677] ; Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 Har. &
McH. (Md.) 429 [1 Am.Dec. 411] .) In the Dyer case, the
court was concerned with whether the trial court had jurisdiction to decide what group in a church had the authority
to discharge the pastor and, upon so determining, to ascertain whether the proceedings for the discharge followed the
established procedure. The court held that jurisdiction existed, stating (p. 268): "With this understanding of the
church government it becomes apparent that the respondent
court not only has jurisdiction to construe the provisions of
the constitution which we have been considering, but also
has jurisdiction to determine that the Los Angeles Association of Congregational Churches and Ministers has withdrawn
its fellowship from the petitioner and the effect of such
action, as to whether it is final and conclusive, as well as
its effect upon the petitioner. . . . It is proper, however, to
call attention to the fact that our Supreme Court has definitely
aligned itself with those authorities which hold that the civil
authorities cannot disregard the decisions of the church tribunals. . . . It also seems meet to say, in order to avoid subsequent possible confusion, that Watson v. Jones, supra, 80
U.S. [13 Wall.] 726, [20 L.Ed. 666] also quotes with approval
from authorities to the effect that the supervisory power of
the civil tribunals may not be invoked when the only property involved is the loss of clerical office and the salary incident thereto. Having determined that the respondent court
has the authority to determine what the ecclesiastical tribunal
decided, it also follows that it has the jurisdiction to determine whether one who has been deprived of the fellowship
of the Los Angeles Association of Congregational Churches
and Ministers can or cannot act or claim to act as pastor of
one of the units constituting the Los Angeles Association.''
In Maxwell v. Brougher, 99 Cal.App.2d 824 [222 P.2d 910],
the court was considering the jurisdiction of the court to
determine the manner in which the members and officers were
to proceed in hearing and disposing of charges against the
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pastor. Jurisdiction was denied but on the ground that the
decision of a church tribunal on ecclesiastical matters is final
rather than whether- the church had followed its rules. No
consideration was given to the emoluments of the position.
Here we have no such question. No church tribunal has
properly and finally acted. We are holding that the court
may determine whether the rules of the society have been
followed and if they have not what will be the resulting
effect on civil and property rights.
[14] Generally a court will decide whether a meeting was
properly called or conducted when civil or property rights
are involved. (Trett v. Lambeth, (Mo.App.) 195 S.W.2d 524.)
In regard to the conduct of an election by the congregation
or other church body or its officers under a court decree it
has been said: ''We do not mean that an election can never
be called. If-for instance-a complaint should be filed stating that by force, threats, etc., the desire of the majority
could not be ascertained, then a court could properly decree
a clear election-not to decide the result of a pending case,
but as granting the relief prayed, i.e., a clear election.''
(Elston v. Wilborn, 208 Ark. 377 [186 S.W.2d 662, 664,
158 A.L.R. 179].) (See 31 L.R.A.N.S. 686.) An analogous
principle is expressed in referring to shareholders' meetings
in an ordinary corporation : ''The court may determine the
person entitled to the office of director or may order a new
election to be held or appointment to be made, and direct
such other relief as may be just and proper.'' (Corp. Code,
§ 2238.) That section is made applicable to nonprofit corporations. (Corp. Code, § 9002.) [15] While we may not
be dealing with the officer of a corporation in the strict sense
(the pastor of a church is involved) the situation is similar
and we see no reason why an election cannot be conducted
where, as appears, a fair and proper election cannot be conducted by the church and the election previously held was
irregular and of no effect. In other words the appropriate
body of the church is assisted in acting within its proper
sphere, according to its rules and regulations, to protect civil
and property rights. If the problem was whether the pastor
was preaching a theology contrary to the denominational doctrine or conducting religious services in a manner out of har, mony with the ritual of the church, it would clearly not be
within the province of a court to interfere, and the controversy
would have to be settled by the church tribunals. [16] But
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where, as here, the question presented is whether the property and funds of the church are being handled in accordance with the by-laws and rules of the church corporation
or sueh by-laws and rules are being pt'operly observed by
the governing body of the cllllrch, those aggrieved may seek
redress through court action.
The petition for the writ of prohibition is denied and the
alternative writ is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
EDlVIONDS, J.-Because, in my opinion, prohibition is not
the proper remedy, 1 concur in the judgment denying the
petition for the writ and discharging the alternative writ.
'l'he principal objections in this proceeding are to the interlocutory judgment, which is not appealable. In effect, Banks
seeks, and the majority permit, the writ to be used as a
method of appeal from that judgment. As stated in the
opinion, ''There is a serious obstacle to a review of the interlocutory judgment by the writ which petitioner requests because there is nothing there to prohibit.'' However, despite
this difficulty, the basic issue is decided upon the merits
without the benefit of any record on appeal or transcript
of the evidence. Lacking these essentials to an adequate review of the judgment, the majority are forced to assume
most of the relevant facts and imply much of the remainder
from the limited, and confusing, findings made by the trial
court. It is impossible, from the few facts which appear,
to determine whether the issue is correctly decided upon
the merits. It well may be that the record, which is not before this court, would disclose judicial interference with denmninational doctrine.
The petitioner has not alleged any reasons why he will
be injured by awaiting the final judgment, from which he
may appeal. The trial has been completed and little remJ1ins to be done before a final adjudication. For this reason,
the general rule of inadequacy of an appeal after trial when
the court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the action is
not here applicable. The expenditure of time and money
alone is not sufficient to render the remedy by appeal in- .
adequate. (Jollie v. Super1:or Court, 38 Cal.2d 52, 56 [237
P.2d 641] .) Apparently, the delay and expense to carry
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the action to final judgment will be negligible in comparison
to that already incurred.
The real purpose of the present proceeding is to review
a judgment from which no appeal lies, rather than to prevent
the court from hearing and determining an action of which
it does not have jurisdiction. The final judgment, from which
an appeal will lie, obviously will be based upon issues of law
and fact already determined by the interlocutory judgment.
There is no showing that the petitioner will be prejudiced
by awaiting his proper remedy by appeal. If that procedure
were followed, this court would then have before it a record
upon which to review the judgment.
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was denied January 8, 1953. Edmonds, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22511.

In Bank.
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MANUEL S. MADRUGA, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COUR'l' OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Shipping-Part Ownership of Vessels-Partition or Judicial
Sale.-Federal Judicial Code, § 1333, as amended in 1949,
declaring that federal district courts have original jurisdiction
exclusive of state courts of any civil case or admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled," authorizes a
state court, in a partition proceeding instituted by a majority
of the coowners of a vessel, to decree ownership interests, sale
of the vessel, and distribution of the proceeds, at least where
the granting of such relief does not conflict with the federal
maritime policy that the majority owners determine the use
and employment of the vessel.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of San Diego County from further proceedings in an
action. vVrit denied.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Shipping, § 10; Am.Jur., Shipping, § 108.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Shipping, § 13.
40 C.2d-3

